

STATE OF FLORIDA AUDITOR GENERAL

Operational Audit

Report No. 2018-128
March 2018

**SEMINOLE COUNTY
DISTRICT SCHOOL BOARD**



Sherrill F. Norman, CPA
Auditor General

Board Members and Superintendent

During the 2016-17 fiscal year, Dr. Walter Griffin served as Superintendent of the Seminole County Schools and the following individuals served as School Board Members.

	<u>District No.</u>
Jeffrey Bauer	1
Karen Almond	2
Abby Sanchez	3
Amy Lockhart, Chair from 11-22-16, Vice Chair through 11-21-16	4
Dr. Tina Calderone, Vice Chair from 11-22-16, Chair through 11-21-16	5

The team leader was Keith Auyang, CPA, and the audit was supervised by Keith A. Wolfe, CPA.

Please address inquiries regarding this report to Micah E. Rodgers, CPA, Audit Manager, by e-mail at micahrodgers@aud.state.fl.us or by telephone at (850) 412-2905.

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SEMINOLE COUNTY DISTRICT SCHOOL BOARD

SUMMARY

This operational audit of the Seminole County School District (District) focused on selected District processes and administrative activities and included a follow-up on findings noted in our report No. 2015-064. Our operational audit disclosed the following:

Finding 1: The District did not always timely cancel purchasing cards after employees separated from District employment.

Finding 2: Some unnecessary information technology (IT) user access privileges existed that increased the risk that unauthorized disclosure of student social security numbers (SSNs) may occur. In addition, the District did not document that periodic review of the access privileges to student SSNs were conducted to determine whether such privileges were necessary or that any inappropriate or unnecessary access privileges were timely removed.

Finding 3: District IT security controls related to user authentication continue to need improvement.

BACKGROUND

The Seminole County School District (District) is part of the State system of public education under the general direction of the Florida Department of Education (FDOE), and is governed by State law and State Board of Education rules. Geographic boundaries of the District correspond with those of Seminole County. The governing body of the District is the Seminole County District School Board (Board), which is composed of five elected members. The appointed Superintendent of Schools is the Executive Officer of the Board. During the 2016-17 fiscal year, the District operated 60 elementary, middle, high, and specialized schools; sponsored 4 charter schools; and reported 67,093 unweighted full-time equivalent students.

This operational audit of the District focused on selected processes and administrative activities and included a follow-up on findings noted in our report No. 2015-064. The results of our audit of the District's financial statements and Federal awards for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2017, were presented in a separate report.

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Finding 1: Purchasing Card Program

The District utilizes purchasing cards (P-cards) to expedite the purchase of selected goods and services. Purchases made with P-cards are subject to the same rules and regulations that apply to other District purchases and are subject to additional requirements in the *Purchasing Card Program Procedures Manual (Manual)*. According to the *Manual*, when a cardholder ends employment, the cost center representative must collect and destroy the P-card and return the destroyed card and a completed cardholder maintenance form to the P-card contact who will notify the bank to cancel the card.

P-card expenditures totaled \$6.5 million for the period July 1, 2016, through February 17, 2017, and, as of February 17, 2017, 513 District P-cards were in use. To determine whether the District promptly canceled applicable P-cards, we examined District records for 22 of the 50 cardholders who separated from District employment during the period July 1, 2016, through February 17, 2017. We found that the District did not timely cancel the P-cards for 11 of the 22 former employees as the cards were canceled 14 to 191 days, or an average of 42 days, after the employment separation dates.

In response to our inquiries, District personnel indicated that the untimely P-card cancellations were due to delays by the cost center representatives who did not timely notify, or return the P-card to, the P-card administrator for cancellation. While the agreement between the District and the bank that administers the P-card program allows the District 60 days to dispute charges and our examination of District records disclosed that the 11 former employees did not use the P-cards after their employment separation dates, untimely cancellation of P-card privileges increases the risk that such privileges could be misused by former employees or others and may limit the District's ability to satisfactorily resolve disputed charges.

Recommendation: The District should enhance P-card procedures to ensure that P-card privileges are promptly canceled upon a cardholder's separation from District employment.

Finding 2: Information Technology User Access Privileges

The Legislature has recognized in State law¹ that social security numbers (SSNs) can be used to acquire sensitive personal information, the release of which could result in fraud against individuals, or cause other financial or personal harm. Therefore, public entities are required to provide extra care in maintaining such information to ensure its confidential status. Effective controls restrict individuals from accessing information unnecessary for their assigned job responsibilities and provide for documented, periodic reviews of information technology (IT) user access privileges to help prevent individuals from accessing sensitive personal information inconsistent with their responsibilities.

Pursuant to State law,² the District identified each student using a Florida education identification number obtained from the FDOE. However, student SSNs were maintained within the District management information system (MIS) to, for example, register newly enrolled students and transmit information to the FDOE through a secure-file procedure. Board policies³ identify student SSNs as confidential data and District acceptable use policies⁴ require that personnel maintain the confidentiality of student data in accordance with the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act and not misuse IT resources to review confidential student data. District personnel are also required to certify that they will comply with these requirements. District personnel performed annual reviews of IT user access privileges to monitor access privileges; however, these reviews did not extend to access privileges to student SSNs.

As of June 2017, the MIS contained the SSNs for a total of 172,610 former and 42,264 current District students. Our examination of District records disclosed that a total of 405 District employees, such as school administrators, full-time enrollment clerks, and IT personnel had access to the student SSNs.

¹ Section 119.071(5)(a), Florida Statutes.

² Section 1008.386, Florida Statutes.

³ School Board Policy 6.69, *Social Security Numbers*.

⁴ Policy 6.891, *Acceptable Use Policy for Electronic Creating Digital Citizens*.

However, although we requested, District records were not provided to demonstrate whether the 405 employees required continuous access to former and current student SSNs to perform their required duties. In response to our inquiries, District personnel indicated that the MIS did not have a mechanism to mask SSNs or restrict access to only those authorized personnel who had a demonstrated need. Notwithstanding the limitations of the District MIS, the existence of unnecessary access privileges and the lack of documented, periodic reviews of IT user access privileges to student SSNs increase the risk of unauthorized disclosure of student SSNs and the possibility the sensitive personnel information may be used to commit a fraud against District students or others.

Recommendation: The District should ensure that only those individuals who have a demonstrated need to access student SSNs have such access. Such efforts should include:

- **Documented periodic reviews of access privileges to student SSNs to determine whether such privileges are necessary and the timely removal of any inappropriate or unnecessary access privileges detected.**
- **District action to incorporate a mechanism in the MIS to mask SSNs or otherwise limit access to certain data fields, such as student SSNs, to employees who have a demonstrated need for such access.**
- **Identification of the individuals who need continuous access privileges to current and former student SSNs and authorization documenting the purpose for such access privileges. If an individual only requires occasional access, access privileges should be granted only for the time needed.**

Finding 3: Information Technology – Security Controls – User Authentication

Security controls are intended to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of District data and information technology (IT) resources. Our audit procedures disclosed that certain District security controls related to user authentication need improvement. We are not disclosing specific details of the issues in this report to avoid the possibility of compromising District data and IT resources. However, we have notified appropriate District management of the specific issues.

Without adequate security controls related to user authentication, the risk is increased that the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of District data and IT resources may be compromised. Similar findings related to user authentication were communicated to District management in connection with our report Nos. 2015-064 and 2012-053.

Recommendation: District management should improve security controls related to user authentication to ensure the continued confidentiality, integrity, and availability of District data and IT resources.

PRIOR AUDIT FOLLOW-UP

Except for Finding 3, which was also noted as finding No. 11 in our report No. 2015-064, and as finding No. 7 in our report No. 2012-053, the District had taken corrective actions for applicable findings included in our report No. 2015-064.

OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY

The Auditor General conducts operational audits of governmental entities to provide the Legislature, Florida's citizens, public entity management, and other stakeholders unbiased, timely, and relevant information for use in promoting government accountability and stewardship and improving government operations.

We conducted this operational audit from January 2017 to August 2017 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

The objectives of this operational audit were to:

- Evaluate management's performance in establishing and maintaining internal controls, including controls designed to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse, and in administering assigned responsibilities in accordance with applicable laws, rules, regulations, contracts, grant agreements, and other guidelines.
- Examine internal controls designed and placed in operation to promote and encourage the achievement of management's control objectives in the categories of compliance, economic and efficient operations, reliability of records and reports, and safeguarding of assets, and identify weaknesses in those controls.
- Determine whether management had taken corrective actions for findings included in our report No. 2015-064.
- Identify statutory and fiscal changes that may be recommended to the Legislature pursuant to Section 11.45(7)(h), Florida Statutes.

This audit was designed to identify, for those programs, activities, or functions included within the scope of the audit, weaknesses in management's internal controls, instances of noncompliance with applicable laws, rules, regulations, contracts, grant agreements, and other guidelines; and instances of inefficient or ineffective operational policies, procedures, or practices. The focus of this audit was to identify problems so that they may be corrected in such a way as to improve government accountability and efficiency and the stewardship of management. Professional judgment has been used in determining significance and audit risk and in selecting the particular transactions, legal compliance matters, records, and controls considered.

As described in more detail below, for those programs, activities, and functions included within the scope of our audit, our audit work included, but was not limited to, communicating to management and those charged with governance the scope, objectives, timing, overall methodology, and reporting of our audit; obtaining an understanding of the program, activity, or function; exercising professional judgment in considering significance and audit risk in the design and execution of the research, interviews, tests, analyses, and other procedures included in the audit methodology; obtaining reasonable assurance of the overall sufficiency and appropriateness of the evidence gathered in support of our audit findings and conclusions; and reporting on the results of the audit as required by governing laws and auditing standards.

Our audit included transactions, as well as events and conditions, occurring during the 2016-17 fiscal year audit period, and selected District actions taken prior and subsequent thereto. Unless otherwise indicated in this report, these records and transactions were not selected with the intent of statistically projecting the results, although we have presented for perspective, where practicable, information concerning relevant population value or size and quantifications relative to the items selected for examination.

An audit by its nature does not include a review of all records and actions of management, staff, and vendors, and as a consequence, cannot be relied upon to identify all instances of noncompliance, fraud, waste, abuse, or inefficiency.

In conducting our audit, we:

- Reviewed the District's information technology (IT) policies and procedures to determine whether the policies and procedures addressed certain important IT control functions, such as security, systems development and maintenance, network configuration management, system backups, and disaster recovery.
- Evaluated District procedures for maintaining and reviewing employee access to IT resources. We examined selected user access privileges to District enterprise resource planning (ERP) system finance and human resources (HR) applications to determine the appropriateness and necessity of the access based on employees' job duties and user account functions and whether the access prevented the performance of incompatible duties. Specifically, we:
 - Tested selected critical ERP system finance application functions resulting in the review of the appropriateness of access privileges granted to 161 District employees, and to determine the appropriateness and necessity of the access based on the employee's job duties.
 - Tested selected critical ERP system HR application functions resulting in the review of the appropriateness of access privileges granted to 39 District employees, and to determine the appropriateness and necessity of the access based on the employee's job duties.
- Reviewed District procedures to prohibit former employees' access to electronic data files. We also reviewed selected access privileges for 11 of the 50 employees who separated from District employment during the period July 1, 2016, to March 7, 2017, to determine whether the access privileges had been timely deactivated.
- Evaluated the District's security policies and procedures governing the classification, management, and protection of sensitive and confidential information.
- Determined whether a comprehensive IT disaster recovery plan was in place, designed properly, operating effectively, and had been recently tested.
- Examined selected operating system, database, network, and application security settings to determine whether authentication controls were configured and enforced in accordance with IT best practices.
- Determined whether a comprehensive, written IT risk assessment had been developed to document the District's risk management and assessment processes and security controls intended to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data and IT resources.
- Determined whether an adequate, comprehensive IT security awareness and training program was in place.
- Evaluated IT procedures for requesting, testing, approving, and implementing changes to the District finance and HR applications.

- Evaluated District policies and procedures and examined supporting documentation to determine whether audit logging and monitoring controls were configured in accordance with IT best practices.
- Evaluated the District data center's physical access controls to determine whether vulnerabilities existed.
- Determined whether a fire suppression system had been installed in the District's data center.
- Reviewed supporting documentation to determine whether the District effectively monitored the financial condition of District-sponsored charter schools.
- Analyzed the District's General Fund total unassigned and assigned fund balances at June 30, 2017, to determine whether the total was less than 3 percent of the fund's projected revenues, as specified in Section 1011.051, Florida Statutes. We also performed analytical procedures to determine the ability of the District to make future debt service payments.
- From the population of \$38.6 million in total expenditures and transfers made during the period July 1, 2014, to December 31, 2016, from nonvoted capital outlay tax levy proceeds, Public Education Capital Outlay funds, and other restricted capital project funds, examined documentation supporting 30 selected expenditures and transfers totaling \$9.6 million to determine compliance with the restrictions imposed on the use of these resources.
- Evaluated District controls and reviewed selected District records to determine whether the District provided individuals with a written statement as to the purpose of collecting their social security numbers (SSNs). Also, for SSNs collected, we evaluated whether District controls appropriately secured and protected the confidentiality of the SSNs.
- Examined the District Web site to determine whether the 2016-17 fiscal year proposed, tentative, and official budgets were prominently posted pursuant to Section 1011.035(2), Florida Statutes.
- Examined District records to determine whether the District established an audit committee and followed prescribed procedures to contract for audit services pursuant to Section 218.391, Florida Statutes, for the 2014-15 and 2015-16 fiscal years.
- Examined supporting documentation to determine whether required internal funds audits for the 2016-17, 2015-16, and 2014-15 fiscal years were timely performed pursuant to State Board of Education Rule 6A-1.087, Florida Administrative Code, and Chapter 8 – School Internal Funds, *Financial and Program Cost Accounting and Reporting for Florida Schools (Red Book)*, and whether the audit reports were presented to the Board.
- Evaluated the two employee contracts to determine whether the severance pay provisions complied with Section 215.425(4), Florida Statutes.
- From the population of compensation payments totaling \$148.8 million to 9,125 employees for the period July 1, 2016, through December 31, 2016, examined District records supporting compensation payments totaling \$18,592 to 30 selected employees to determine the accuracy of the rate of pay and whether supervisory personnel reviewed and approved employee reports of time worked.
- Determined whether the appointed Superintendent's compensation for the audit period was in accordance with State law, rules, and Board policies.
- Examined District records to determine whether the Board adopted a salary schedule with differentiated pay for both instructional personnel and school administrators based on District-determined factors, including, but not limited to, additional responsibilities, school demographics, critical shortage areas, and level of job performance difficulties in compliance with Section 1012.22(1)(c)4.b., Florida Statutes.

- From the population of 4,173 instructional personnel and 164 school administrators during the audit period, examined supporting documentation for 30 selected employees to determine whether the District had developed adequate performance assessment procedures for instructional personnel and school administrators based on student performance and other criteria in accordance with Section 1012.34(3), Florida Statutes, and determined whether a portion of each selected instructional employee's compensation was based on performance in accordance with Section 1012.22(1)(c)4., Florida Statutes.
- Examined District records, as of February 28, 2017, for 17 employees selected from the population of 10,315 employees to determine whether District employees who had direct contact with students were subjected to the required fingerprinting and background screenings.
- Examined District policies, procedures, and related records for the audit period for school volunteers to determine whether the District searched prospective volunteers' names against the Dru Sjodin National Sexual Offender Public Web site maintained by the United States Department of Justice, as required by Section 943.04351, Florida Statutes.
- Examined District records supporting the eligibility of 30 selected District recipients of the Florida Best and Brightest Teacher Scholarship Program awards from the population of 436 District teachers who received scholarships totaling \$2.7 million during the audit period.
- Examined District records supporting the three payments totaling \$17,312 to employees for other than travel and payroll payments during the audit period to determine whether the payments were reasonable, adequately supported, for valid District purposes, and were not contrary to Section 112.313, Florida Statutes.
- For the District's significant construction project with expenditures totaling \$11.2 million and in progress during the audit period, examined documentation for project expenditures of \$1.3 million to determine compliance with Board policies, District procedures, and provisions of State laws and rules. Also, for the construction management contract with a guaranteed maximum price of \$43.5 million, we:
 - Examined District records to determine whether the construction manager was properly selected.
 - Reviewed District procedures for monitoring subcontractor selection and licensure, and examined records to determine whether subcontractors were properly selected and licensed.
 - Examined District records to determine whether the architects were properly selected and adequately insured.
 - Determined whether the District established appropriate procedures for negotiating and monitoring general conditions costs.
 - Examined District records supporting 2 payments totaling \$604,132 to determine whether District procedures for monitoring payments were adequate and payments were sufficiently supported.
 - Examined District records to determine whether projects progressed as planned and were cost effective and consistent with established benchmarks, and whether District records supported that the contractors performed as expected.
- Examined copies of the 2015-16 fiscal year annual fire safety, casualty safety, and sanitation inspection reports and compared to the applicable 2016-17 fiscal year annual fire safety, casualty, and sanitation inspection reports to determine whether the deficiencies were timely corrected.
- Evaluated District procedures for limiting and monitoring student access to inappropriate Web sites using District-issued take-home electronic devices.

- From the population of purchasing card (P-card) transactions totaling \$6.5 million for the period July 1, 2016, through January 31, 2017, examined documentation supporting 30 selected transactions totaling \$29,814 to determine whether P-cards were administered in accordance with District policies and procedures. We also determined whether the District timely canceled the P-cards for 22 of the 50 cardholders who separated from District employment during the audit period.
- Determined whether rebate revenues received during the period July 1, 2016, to December 31, 2016, totaling \$213,254 for the P-card program were allocated to the appropriate District funds.
- Reviewed District policies and procedures related to identifying potential conflicts of interest. For the Superintendent, five Board members, and four District employees required to file statements of financial interests, we reviewed Florida Department of State, Division of Corporation, records; statements of financial interests; and District records to identify any potential relationships with District vendors that represent a conflict of interest.
- Reviewed four District-sponsored charter school audit reports received during the audit period to determine whether the required audits were performed. We also determined whether the 2015-16 fiscal year audits of the District's direct-support organizations and charter schools were performed pursuant to Chapters 10.700 and 10.850, Rules of the Auditor General, and Section 1001.453, Florida Statutes.
- Evaluated the sufficiency of District procedures to determine whether District charter schools were required to be subjected to an expedited review pursuant to Section 1002.345, Florida Statutes.
- Examined District records and evaluated construction planning processes for the audit period to determine whether processes were comprehensive, included consideration of restricted resources and other alternatives to ensure the most economical and effective approach, and met District short-term and long-term needs.
- Evaluated District procedures for identifying facility maintenance needs and establishing resources to address those needs. We also compared maintenance plans with needs identified in safety inspection reports, reviewed inspection reports for compliance with Federal and State inspection requirements, evaluated District efforts to timely resolve any deficiencies identified during inspections, and tested the work order system for appropriate tracking of maintenance jobs.
- Evaluated District procedures for determining Maintenance Department staffing needs. We also determined whether such procedures included consideration of appropriate factors and performance measures that were supported by factual information.
- Evaluated whether expenditures were reasonable, correctly recorded, adequately documented, for a valid District purpose, properly authorized and approved, and in compliance with applicable State laws, rules, contract terms, and Board policies; and applicable vendors were properly selected. Specifically, from the population of 11,539 expenditures totaling \$50.6 million for the period July 1, 2016, to December 31, 2016, we examined documentation relating to:
 - 30 payments for purchased services totaling \$185,747.
 - 16 payments for general expenditures totaling \$21,854.
- Determined whether the District used supplemental academic instruction and research-based reading instruction allocations to provide, to the applicable schools, pursuant to Section 1011.62(9), Florida Statutes, an additional hour of intensive reading instruction to students every day, schoolwide, during the audit period. Also, we reviewed District records to determine whether the District appropriately reported to the FDOE, pursuant to the 2016 General Appropriations Act (Chapter 2016-066, Laws of Florida), the funding sources, expenditures, and student outcomes for each participating school.

- Examined financial records of the District's self-insured health insurance program during the audit period to determine whether the program was fiscally sound.
- Determined whether the District had adequate Virtual Instruction Program (VIP) policies and procedures.
- Evaluated District records for the audit period to determine whether the District provided the required VIP options and properly informed parents and students about students' rights to participate in a VIP and the VIP enrollment periods as required by Section 1002.45(1)(b) and (10), Florida Statutes.
- Examined student records and evaluated District procedures for the audit period to determine whether the District ensured that VIP students were provided with all necessary instructional materials and, for those eligible students who did not already have such resources in their home, computing resources necessary for program participation as required by Section 1002.45(3)(c) and (d), Florida Statutes.
- From the population of 1,512 students enrolled in the District VIP during the audit period, examined District records for 30 selected students to determine whether the students met the statutory eligibility requirements prescribed by Section 1002.45(5), Florida Statutes.
- Communicated on an interim basis with applicable officials to ensure the timely resolution of issues involving controls and noncompliance.
- Performed various other auditing procedures, including analytical procedures, as necessary, to accomplish the objectives of the audit.
- Prepared and submitted for management response the findings and recommendations that are included in this report and which describe the matters requiring corrective actions. Management's response is included in this report under the heading **MANAGEMENT'S RESPONSE**.

AUTHORITY

Pursuant to the provisions of Section 11.45, Florida Statutes, I have directed that this report be prepared to present the results of our operational audit.



Sherrill F. Norman, CPA
Auditor General

MANAGEMENT'S RESPONSE



SEMINOLE COUNTY
PUBLIC SCHOOLS

WALT GRIFFIN, Ed.D.
Superintendent

Educational Support Center
400 E. Lake Mary Boulevard
Sanford, Florida 32773-7127

March 7, 2018

Sherrill F. Norman, CPA
Auditor General
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Tallahassee, FL 32399-1450

Re: Response to Operational Audit Findings

Dear Ms. Norman:

Attached are our responses to the findings in the operational audit completed by your office. Although audits are never fun, they do provide an opportunity for us to examine our operations for opportunities to improve how we conduct the operations of the District. I want to compliment your staff for their thorough work and professional demeanor.

Sincerely,

Walt Griffin, Ed.D.

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Seminole County District School Board
Response to operational audit findings

Finding 1: The District did not always timely cancel purchasing cards after employees separated from District employment.

Response:

The District has enhanced its P-Card procedures to ensure that P-Card privileges are promptly canceled upon a cardholder's separation from District employment.

To expedite the P-Card cancellation process, the Purchasing & Distribution Services P-Card Contact now receives a weekly report from Human Resources that lists all employee retirements, terminations and transfers. This list is compared to the list of active cardholders, and all retired, terminated and transferred employee P-Cards are immediately placed in a suspension file until the paperwork is received from the appropriate Principal / Department Director.

Finding 2: Some unnecessary information technology (IT) user access privileges existed that increased the risk that unauthorized disclosure of student social security numbers (SSNs) may occur. In addition, the District did not document that periodic review of the access privileges to student SSNs were conducted to determine whether such privileges were necessary or that any inappropriate or unnecessary access privileges were timely removed.

Response:

The District is implementing a quarterly review of user access in its student information system (SIS). On February 27, 2018, the School Board of Seminole County approved a new position, Administrator, Information Security Officer (AISO), who will be in charge of scheduling and conducting these quarterly reviews. Key stakeholders who will review user access include district level executive leadership, school principals, the Chief Information Officer, and the Application Support Manager who is responsible for oversight of the SIS. Procedures are being developed for documenting and granting or restricting access privileges to SSN data regarding current and former students.

On Thursday, February 15, 2018, the Chief Information Officer hosted an on-site business meeting with a representative from the SIS vendor. One of the primary topics of the discussion was restricting access and masking of the SSN field in the SIS. SBSC has reached an agreement with the SIS vendor so that SBSC will be able to provide additional controls and restrictions to the SSN field, thereby reducing access to these sensitive data. Considering the sensitive nature of SSNs, SBSC will also be removing all access to SSNs in its SIS for all employees with the exception of system administrators of the SIS at the district level.

In addition to the controls identified above, the SBSC will be removing all SSNs from its SIS for all kindergarten students in the current 2017-18 academic year.

Seminole County District School Board
Response to operational audit findings

Finding 3: District IT security controls related to user authentication continue to need improvement.

Response:

The District is implementing significant changes to network and device security controls. Specific changes in the areas suggested during the on-site audit discussion are being implemented along with additional changes. In order to avoid security compromises, details about these changes are not provided. However, there two significant changes being phased-in. The first will take effect on Thursday, March 1, 2018 and will impact all SBSC employees when authenticating. The second change will begin the week of March 12, 2018, and will target high profile users and users with elevated access to data. The Information Services Department will work with individuals and departments impacted by the second authentication security measure to be put in place the week of March 12, 2018, so that users are aware of the need and importance of this measure.